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PUBLIC FINANCING OF ELECTIONS: NEW PROPOSALS
TO MEET NEW OBSTACLES
TOM R. MOORE* and RICHARD D. LA BELLE III**
I. INTRODUCTION
In politics, as well as the everyday affairs of personal life and
business, "money talks." Of course, big money talks loudly.
In March 1985, the United States Supreme Court heard the ar-
guments for and against big money in politics in Federal Elections
Commission v. National Conservative Political Action Commit-
tee,' a public financing case involving massive sums spent by a po-
litical action committee to influence the outcome of the 1984 presi-
dential campaign.2 In the name of freedom of speech and freedom
of association under the first amendment,3 the Court struck down
the express congressional prohibition of the subject expenditures 4
and decided that they amounted to constitutionally protected
speech.8 This decision in NCPAC gives advocates of public financ-
ing of elections good reason to reconsider again that advocacy.6
This Article summarily reviews the course of events and reasons
leading to the enactment of numerous campaign financing laws
throughout the country, including public financing legislation. It
then reviews the judicial reaction to such campaign financing
legislation.
In that context and with that background, the authors retreat
from their earlier very positive views favoring public financing, not
only as to presidential elections, but also as to public financing of
campaigns with less visibility. The authors conclude that, in the
absence of further legislative responses to the Supreme Court's
opinions and favorable judicial reactions to those legislative re-
sponses during the next decade, public financing of elections may
become a footnote in the troubled history of American political fi-
*University of Florida, B.S., B.A., 1963; J.D., 1966. Member, Florida House of Represent-
atives, 1974-78. Chairman, House Committee on Elections, Subcommittee on Campaign Fi-
nancing, 1975-76.
**Candidate for the degree Juris Doctor, Florida State University College of Law.
1. 105 S. Ct. 1459 (1985).
2. Id. at 1462, 1465-66.
3. Id. at 1467.
4. Id. at 1462.
5. Id. at 1468.
6. In 1976, the Court decided Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), and opened the door
to massive private independent political expenditures outside the campaign funds of the
candidates.
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nancing. At the moment, there does appear to be a virtually Court-
confirmed constitutional right to buy elections.'
Notwithstanding the "serious obstacles" placed by the Supreme
Court in the path of those who would use public financing to com-
bat the potentially corrupting effect of private money in election
campaigns,8 the Florida Legislature should nevertheless seriously
consider joining the ranks of those state legislatures which have
augmented campaign financing with public funds. The potential
remains for state legislatures and state courts to play a significant
and positive role by using publicly funded campaigns to control
the corrupting influence of money in politics.9
In light of the serious obstacles which do exist, the first venture
by the Florida Legislature into the confused world of public financ-
ing of elections should focus on elections which would be the least
likely to generate controversy and to attract large private indirect
expenditures which would make a mockery of the public funding
system. This cautious approach does not mean that the legislature
should not support carefully drawn public financing legislation for
gubernatorial elections, Florida Cabinet races, or other elections
which, in fact, would create considerable controversy and perhaps
invite ingenious efforts by large contributors to circumvent the leg-
islation. It simply seems advisable to demonstrate in a low-key pi-
lot program that public financing will accomplish the lofty goals of
the campaign financing reforms of the past decade.
The Florida Legislature should take the approach, already taken
7. See Forrester, The New Constitutional Right to Buy Elections, 69 A-B.A. J. 1078
(1983). Justice White concluded in his dissenting opinion on the impact of the majority's
decision in NCPAC that: "The result is that the old system [of presidential campaign fi-
nancing] remains essentially intact, but that much more money is being spent." NCPAC,
105 S. Ct. at 1480 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White failed to "share the majority's equa-
nimity about the infusion of massive PAC expenditures into the political process." Id. at
1479. Justice White also believed that the Court's decision assures the United States "the
worst of both worlds," id. at 1480 (i.e., spending more total dollars than ever before without
holding down the questionable contributions at all).
8. See generally, NCPAC, 105 S. Ct. 1459 (1985); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, (1976);
Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Polit-
ical Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1982).
9. See, e.g., H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY, ELECTIONS, AND POLITICAL RE-
FORM (3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as H. ALEXANDER, 3d ed.]; H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING
POLITICS: MONEY, ELECTIONS, AND POLITICAL REFORM (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as H.
ALEXANDER, 2d ed.]; A. HEARD, THE COSTS OF DEMOCRACY (1960). Herbert E. Alexander,
perhaps the country's leading scholar on how political money is raised and spent, says:
"Some states have been more experimental than the federal government in dealing with
public funding, and the results of their pioneering may affect development of federal electo-
ral regulation policy in the future." H. ALEXANDER, 2d ed., at 42.
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by some states, that a public financing system should make no at-
tempt to limit campaign spending. Public funds made available to
candidates willing to forego contributions from special interest
groups may prove to be a powerful weapon against those candi-
dates who rely on massive special interest funds to reach voters.
Such a "floor without a ceiling" plan would at least give all quali-
fied candidates a certain amount of money with which to work.
As an example of this approach, the appendix to this Article in-
cludes a proposed bill for the public financing of nonpartisan elec-
tions of Florida's trial judges.
II. THE AMERICAN CONSENSUS ON THE CORRUPTING INFLUENCE OF
MONEY IN POLITICS
There is nothing new about criticism which focuses on the rela-
tionship of money and public elections. 0 This section only restates
the conclusions of scholarly discourses, which generally stand for
the proposition that money does have a corrupting influence in
politics and that the degree and extent of this influence continues
to escalate." Providing a brief bibliography of books and articles
should be sufficient to pique the interest of anyone reluctant to
take seriously either the existence of money-in-politics evils in
American politics or the potential of public financing as a means
for combating such evils.' 2
10. As John Quincy Adams, sixth President of the United States, stated: "To pay money
for securing [the Presidency] directly or indirectly" was "incorrect in principle." H. ALEXAN-
DER, 2d Ed., supra note 9,' at 4 (quoting VII MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 468-70 (1875))
(as quoted in J. SHANNON, MONEY AND PoLITms, at 15 (1959).
11. See generally Wright, supra note 8.
12. See generally H. ALEXANDER, 3d ed., supra note 9; H. ALEXANDER, 2d ed., supra note
9; H. ALEXANDER & J. FRUTIG, PUBLIC FINANCING OF STATE ELECTONs: A DATA BOOK AND
ELECTION GUIDE TO PUBLIC FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND CANDIDATES IN SEVENTEEN
STATES (1982); H. ALEXANDER & B. HAGGERTY, POLITICAL REFORM IN CALIFORNIA: How HAS IT
WORKED? (1980); H. BRETTON, THE POWER OF MONEY (1980); COMMON CAUSE, A COMMON
CAUSE GUIDE TO MONEY, POWER, & POLITICS IN THE 97TH CONGRESS (1981); COMMON CAUSE,
How MONEY TALKS IN CONGRESS: A COMMON CAUSE STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF MONEY ON
CONGRESSIONAL DECISION-MAKING (1979); CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, DOLLAR POLITICS (3d
ed. 1982); E. DREW, POLITICS AND MONEY: THE NEW ROAD TO CORRUPTION (1983); A. HEARD,
supra note 9; G. JACOBSON, MONEY IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS (1980); M. MCCARTHY,
ELECTIONS FOR SALE (1972); R. PEABODY, J. BERRY, W. FRASURE, & J. GOLDMAN, To ENACT A
LAW: CONGRESS AND CAMPAIGN FINANCING (1972); T. SCHWARZ, PUBLIC FINANCING OF ELEC-
TIONS: A CONSTITUTIONAL DVISION OF THE WEALTH (1975); G. THAYER, WHO SHAKES THE
MONEY TREE? (1973); Forrester, supra note 7; Peck & McDowell, Dollar Democracy: An
Analysis of Public Financing of State Politics, 15 URB. LAW. 921 (1983); Wright, supra note
8; Note, All the Free Speech That Money Can Buy: Monopolization of Issue Perception in
Referendum Campaigns, 35 U. MIAMI L. REv. 157 (1980).
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This Article accepts, as a self-evident truth, that such political
campaign financing evils do exist to a degree that requires serious
attention. One recent article on the political inequality of cam-
paign financing began by quoting California politician Jesse Un-
ruh, who stated that "[m]oney is the mother's milk of politics.""
That article and others make clear that their premise is not that
this "mother's milk" is healthy and good for the nurturing and de-
velopment of politics, but rather that without strict regulation and
control of that necessity, the nature and quantity of such "milk"
instead may produce sick-or sickening-politics. 4 The electorate,
the candidates, and the legislators will continue to find that there
is a never-ending battle to balance the competing interests of pri-
vate contributors with the independence that elected officials
should have from those who provide them with campaign funds.
The consensus among scholars appears to support the popular
belief that the greater the amount of a contribution, the greater
the potential that the contribution will corrupt the political pro-
cess and certainly the more likely it will appear as corruptive.' 5 No
one suggests that a ten dollar contribution is the same as a $1
thousand contribution in terms of what the contributor expects for
his contribution. In fact, the $1 thousand contributor may expect
recognition by the politician to whom he gave the money and, at
the least, a friendly audience with the politician when the contrib-
utor seeks to have the politician hear his views on some political
issue dear to him.
Similarly, few would quarrel with the proposition that the larger
the amount a candidate receives from persons or organizations
with common goals, the more corruptive the influence of that
money upon the politician. These "special interest" groups fuel the
political engines of campaigns from the lowest elected offices in the
land to the presidency.16 Notwithstanding the freedom of associa-
13. Peck & McDowell, supra note 12, at 921.
14. As one prominent jurist stated: "The predominance of money comes at the expense
of the ideals of liberty and equality that underlie our political system." Wright, supra note
8, at 614.
15. See generally H. ALEXANDER (3d ed.), supra note 9; A. HEARD, supra note 9; For-
rester, supra note 7; Peck & McDowell, supra note 12; Wright, supra note 8; Note, supra
note 12.
16. For instance, according to the results of a joint study by The St. Petersburg Times,
The Miami Herald, and The Orlando Sentinel on the 1984 campaign for the Florida Senate
and House of Representatives, successful candidates for the House positions, which paid
$12,000 per year, listed $5,115,641 in total contributions, $2,322,217 of which was contrib-
uted by PACs. Seven candidates (Gibbons, Dem., Tampa; Gustafson, Dem., Ft. Lauderdale;
Hazouri, Dem., Jacksonville; Kutun, Dem., Miami Beach; Lombard, Repub., Osprey; Mac-
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tion and freedom of speech arguments successfully utilized by
kenzie, Dem., Ft. Lauderdale; and Wallace, Dem., St. Petersburg) raised over $100,000 each.
Seven candidates (Gallagher, Repub., Coconut Grove; Gardner, Dem., Titusville; Gustafson;
Hazouri; Mackenzie; Ward, Dem., Ft. Walton Beach; and Webster, Repub., Orlando) re-
ceived over $50,000 each in contributions from PACs. Three candidates (Gutman, Repub.,
Miami; Lombard; and Morse, Repub., Miami) spent over $20,000 apiece of their own money
in furtherance of their campaign. The St. Petersburg Times, Mar. 31, 1985 at D6-7, col1.
The twenty successful candidates for the Senate raised a total of $1,991,090, of which
$823,015 was contributed by PACs. Half of the candidates raised more than $100,000 each.
Two candidates (Hair, Dem., Jacksonville; Hill, Dem., Miami) raised more than $200,000
each. Only two candidates (Plummer, Dem., Miami; Jennings, Repub., Orlando) raised less
than $20,000 each. Eight candidates (Childers, Dem., Pensacola; Frank, Dem., Tampa;
Gordon, Dem., Miami; Hair; Hill; Langley, Repub., Clermont; Myers, Repub., Hobe Sound;
and Scott, Repub., Ft. Lauderdale) received more than $50,000 each in PAC contributions.
Of these, four candidates (Hair, Hill, Myers, and Scott) received over $80,000 each, with all
but Myers receiving more than $90,000 each. Only two successful candidates (Johnson;
Weinstein, Dem., Coral 'Springs) received less than $10,000 each in PAC contributions.
Johnson, however, led the Senate candidates by far in spending $20,000 of his own money to
get elected. Id.
The statistics for congressional races are even more staggering. According to a Common
Cause study of the 1984 elections for the United States House of Representatives, the 802
general election candidates for the House raised, in the period from January 1, 1983,
through December 31, 1984, a total of $196,756,155, of which $74,364,036 was from PACs. It
is also evident whom PACs think are their best bets-for every $1 contributed by PACs to
challengers for House seats, $4.60 was contributed to incumbents. PAC contributions to
House candidates also increased an average of 32% over 1982. House Incumbents Get $.44
of Every Campaign Dollar from PACs in 1984 Election, Common Cause Study Shows,
COMMON CAUSE STUDY (Apr. 12, 1985), at 1.
The list of fundraisers was headed by Stein, Dem., N.Y., $1,780,131; Jones, Dem., Okla.,
$1,419,588; and Green, Repub., N.Y., $1,143,656. Altogether, 51 candidates raised more than
$600,000 each. Forty-two of these candidates won.
The leading PAC contribution recipients were Jones, who received a record-setting
$696,594; Patterson, Dem., Cal., $447,800; and Morrison, Dem., Conn., $428,393. In all, 38
candidates, all of them incumbents, received a minimum of $250,000 each from PACs.
The figures for United States Senate races defy belief. The recitation of the figures for a
single campaign will suffice. In the hard fought contest in North Carolina that pitted incum-
bent Jesse Helms against Governor Jim Hunt, the candidates spent over $22,000,000, mak-
ing the campaign the most expensive in Senate history. The effect that this kind of money
has on the political process is graphically illustrated in a post-election analysis by Bill Pe-
terson of the Washington Post:
The big-money nature of the race made experimentation possible. The Helms
camp came up with several innovations. Many voters, for example, were surprised
to pick up the telephone and hear the recorded voice of Ronald Reagan on the
other end of the line, extolling Helms' virtues....
But much of the creative energy in both campaigns and the biggest chunk of the
$22 million spent in the race went for television commercials stretching over 20
months. Some 7,800 TV spots were broadcast during the last five weeks alone.
The nightly tracking polls and the ability of both campaigns to produce com-
mercials almost overnight produced a new kind of electronic politics, impossible a
decade ago. Big money enabled the two campaigns to wage a day-by-day, week-by-
week debate far more important than the League of Women Voters forums com-
mon to most races.
Peterson, North Carolina: Lessons of a Dirty Campaign, Wash. Post Nat'l W'kly Ed., Dec.
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groups thus far in winning their independence substantially to in-
fluence American elections, new legislative offensives to replace the
prohibitions struck down by the Supreme Court can be expected
due to the hostility of both the public and legislators toward this
kind of financing.
Not even a candidate's personal wealth can shield him from the
evil mantle thrown about him by big money in a political cam-
paign. Critics decry the millionaire club to which one must belong
to run for high office.' 7
A. Recent Reforms in Financing Politics in America
Long before Watergate and its backlash, Americans knew their
elected officials had to spend money to get elected. 18 Even George
Washington furnished "an average outlay of more than a quart and
a half per person" of rum, rum punch, wine, beer, and cider to win
in his first foray into elective politics in the 1757 election to the
Virginia House of Burgesses.' 9
Without dwelling on the specifics of 200 years of campaigning
history, by the 1970's legislative action had dealt strongly with
3, 1984, at 6, col. 1.
17. For example, six of the past nine Presidents (F.D. Roosevelt, Eisenhower, Kennedy,
Johnson, Carter, and Reagan) are considered to have been wealthy or moderately wealthy
men when they took office. H. ALEXANDER, 3d ed., supra note 9, at 25-26. In 1983, at least 23
senators and 19 representatives were millionaires. Id. at 28. In 1978, 58 members of Con-
gress gave or lent at least $100,000 to their own campaigns. Id. at 27. As one author
comments:
In New York a political unknown recently gained the gubernatorial nomination of
a major political party. He spent more than $7,000,000 of his own money to do so.
One family of billionaires produced three governors, another-a president, an at-
torney general, and a United States senator. The examples are numerous, and the
evidence is overwhelming that money increasingly controls American government.
It has become the common denominator of success.
Forrester, supra note 7, at 1078-79.
Sen. John D. Rockefeller, IV, Dem., W.Va., has spent a total of $25,000,000 of his own
money on four statewide races, $12,000,000 in the 1984 Senate race alone. Romano, If
You've Got It, Flaunt It, Wash. Post Nat'l W'kly Ed., July 15, 1985, at 11, col. 1. Of this
fact, Rockefeller says: "Resources are an important part of politics, and I can join those who
regret that fact, but it is part of the real world. You get into a campaign, you do what you
think you have to do." Id. at 11, col.2.
Nelson Rockefeller, John Rockefeller's uncle and long-time governor of New York and
Vice President under Gerald Ford, testified in his vice-presidential confirmation hearings
that he and members of his family had spent $17,000,000 of their own money over the years
on his various campaigns. H. ALEXANDER, 3d ed., supra note 9, at 26.
18. See generally H. ALEXANDER, 3d. ed., supra note 9, ch. 2.
19. H. ALEXANDER, 2d ed., supra note 9, at xi (quoting G. THAYER, WHO SHAKES THE
MONEY TRE? 25 (1973)).
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concerns over large contributions, whether from wealthy individu-
als or special interest groups. Such legislation required disclosure
of campaign finances, under the assumption that "Who gave it"
and "Who got it" laws would help arm candidates and the press
with information about each candidate's ties to various groups or
individuals.20
With the onset of Watergate and other political corruption in-
vestigations throughout the country, the federal and state legisla-
tures began to enact other reforms. They gave formal structure to
the regulation and control of campaign finances, often through spe-
cial election or ethics commissions.21 They limited campaign con-
tributions in an effort to cut down on big donations from single
sources," including a candidate's personal wealth.23 Similarly, they
limited total campaign expenditures by each candidate.2
B. Public Financing Laws
Even before Watergate, Congress acted to infuse federal tax dol-
lars into presidential campaigns.2 5 This trend accelerated with the
adoption of public financing programs by no less than nineteen
states.26
The general absence of limitations on expenditures in state cam-
paign financing acts resulted in part from the reaction of the Su-
preme Court, in 1976,2 7 to the onslaught of campaign financing re-
forms and, in particular, to the federal government's prohibition of
third-party indirect campaign expenditures in the presidential
public financing law.28
20. See generally id.
21. H. ALEXANDER, 3d ed., supra note 9, at 171-73.
22. Id. at 165-71.
23. Id. at 163-65.
24. Id. at 166-68.
25. Id. at 34-37.
26. These states are California, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Mas-
sachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Rhode Island, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Oregon's experimental system expired in 1981
and was not renewed. Maryland has suspended the operation of its program until 1986.
Oklahoma's statute does not currently conform to the state constitution. H. ALEXANDER, 3d
ed., supra note 9, at 166-68. Eleven states (California, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Mas-
sachusetts, Montana, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Virginia) enacted public financ-
ing laws that did not attempt to limit expenditures. Four states (Michigan, Minnesota, New
Jersey, and Wisconsin) enacted public financing acts that impose limitations upon expendi-
tures by candidates who accept public funds. Id.
27. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
28. 26 U.S.C. § 9012(0 (1982). This section was held unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court in FEC v. NCPAC, 105 S. Ct. 1459 (1985).
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III. THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO THE REFORMS
A. Does the Supreme Court Support a Constitutional Right to
Buy Elections?
The action of the Supreme Court regarding congressional limita-
tions on contributions and expenditures in political campaigns has
been mixed, but the Court's decisions suggest it is insensitive to
the threat that campaign money can pose to the democratic pro-
cess.29 While limitations on contributions have generally been up-
held, restrictions in the crucial area of independent expenditures
have been struck down by the Court, undermining attempts to
eliminate corruption or the appearance of corruption.
In the landmark case of Buckley v. Valeo,30 the Supreme Court
considered provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971 (FECA)3' which limited contributions to a candidate for fed-
eral office and expenditures in support of such a candidacy. The
Court found that the limitations operated "in an area of the most
fundamental First Amendment activities. '32 The Court dealt sepa-
rately with the limitations on contributions and those on expendi-
tures. The former were upheld, while the latter were held to be
unconstitutional. 3
Even though they were upheld, the limitations on contributions
restricted the freedom to associate and freedom of political expres-
sion and thus were subject to the closest scrutiny.3 4 However, the
Court found the Act's primary purpose of preventing corruption or
the appearance of corruption sufficient to justify the $1 thousand
limit on contributions.3 The Court stated that:
To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a politi-
cal quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the
integrity of our system of representative democcacy is under-
mined. Although the scope of such pernicious practices can never
be reliably ascertained, the deeply disturbing examples surfacing
after the 1972 election demonstrate that the problem is not an
illusory one.36
29. See Forrester, supra note 7.
30. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
31. 86 Stat. 3 (1973) (as amended 88 Stat. 1263 (1974)).
32. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14.
33. Id. at 143.
34. Id. at 25.
35. Id. at 26, 29.
36. Id. at 26-27.
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Rejecting the argument that the same objectives could be accom-
plished by less restrictive means of bribery laws and disclosure re-
quirements, the Court found that Congress was within constitu-
tional limits in determining that such measures were only partially
effective and that contribution limitations were also needed.3 7
The Court also considered the provisions of the Act limiting ex-
penditures of a candidate and expenditures made on his behalf.
The Court looked at three such provisions: (1) a cap on indepen-
dent expenditures in favor of a candidate's campaign;3 8 (2) limits
on the amount of personal funds a candidate or his immediate
family may spend on behalf of his campaign;19 and (3) overall limi-
tations on the total amount of money that may be expended by a
candidate for federal office, with differing amounts set for different
offices.40
In striking down the limits on independent expenditures,41
which the authors prefer to include within the broader term of
"private indirect expenditures," the Court found the independent
character of these expenditures to be all-important: "The absence
of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the
candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of the expen-
diture to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expend-
itures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments
from the candidate."42 Thus, the Court began to draw a curtain of
unreality across the stage of political fundraising and expenditures.
Interestingly, the Court stated: "It would naively underestimate
the ingenuity and resourcefulness of persons and groups desiring to
buy influence to believe that they would have much difficulty de-
vising expenditures that skirted the restriction on express advo-
cacy of election or defeat but nevertheless benefited the candi-
date's campaign."4 3 After invalidating Congress' effort to address
the problem, the Court's majority suggested nothing to stop such
indirect expenditures. It was left to others to make those sugges-
tions. As Justice White pointed out in dissent: "It would make lit-
tle sense to me, and apparently made none to Congress, to limit
the amounts an individual may give to a candidate or spend with
37. Id. at 27-28.
38. Id. at 39-51.
39. Id. at 51-54.
40. Id. at 54-59.
41. Id. at 51.
42. Id. at 47.
43. Id. at 45.
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his approval but fail to limit the amounts that could be spent on
his behalf."4 Justice White favored relying on the determination
of Congress-"those who know" 45-in upholding the Act's limits
on independent expenditures. He described these restrictions as
"essential to prevent transparent and widespread evasion of the
contribution limits. 40
The Court similarly struck down the cap on the use of personal
funds in a candidate's campaign. 7 The Court reasoned that the
purpose of preventing corruption cannot be served where a candi-
date can rely on his own funds rather than someone else's s.4  This
reason, however, begs the question of whether the democratic pro-
cess is corrupted when one increasingly has to be personally
wealthy in order to run for office, either state or federal.4 e Indeed,
as Justice Marshall pointed out in dissent, the limitations on con-
tributions upheld by the Court place "a premium on a candidate's
personal wealth."50
Finally, the Court invalidated the provision placing an overall
limit on the amount of money a candidate for federal office can
spend in his campaign.5' Unconvinced by the justifications ad-
vanced in support of the provision, the Court found that limiting
the corrupting influence of large contributions and equalizing the
financial power of competing candidates cannot justify an infringe-
44. Id. at 261 (White, J., dissenting).
Congress was plainly of the view that these expenditures also have corruptive po-
tential; but the Court strikes down the provision, strangely enough claiming more
insight as to what may improperly influence candidates than is possessed by the
majority of Congress that passed this bill and the President who signed it. Those
supporting the bill undeniably included many seasoned professionals who have
been deeply involved in elective processes and who have viewed them at close
range over many years.
Id.
The records of the Federal Election Commission state:
There are now some 1702 corporate PACs, with incomes totalling $39,539,381 dur-
ing the first 18 months of the 1984 election cycle; 675 trade association PACs with
incomes of $35,934,635; and 417 union PACs with incomes of $30,264,140. ...
This clearly represents a weighty accumulation of wealth that could substantially
affect presidential elections.
Brief for Appellant Federal Election Commission, at 28, Federal Election Comm'n v. Na-
tional Conservative Political Action Comm., 105 S. Ct. 1459 (1985).
45. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 261.
46. Id. at 262.
47. Id. at 54.
48. Id. at 53.
49. See supra notes 19, 22.
50. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 289 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
51. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58.
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ment of the first amendment. The Court opined that the people,
not the government, must retain control of the "quantity and
range" of debate in a political campaign; 52 therefore, this section
was struck because it unconstitutionally infringed on the ability of
candidates to participate in and influence those debates to the full
extent of their financial ability.5
3
In Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley,54 the Supreme
Court struck down a municipal ordinance that placed a $250 limi-
tation on contributions to committees supporting or opposing city-
wide referendum issues. The Court found the restriction to be vio-
lative of freedom of association and freedom of speech under the
first amendment."5 The Court concluded: "Whatever may be the
state interest or degree of that interest in regulating and limiting
contributions to or expenditures of a candidate or a candidate's
committees there is no significant state or public interest in cur-
tailing debate and discussion of a ballot measure."5
In Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative Polit-
ical Action Committee,57 the Court dealt a further blow, perhaps
fatal in the absence of legislative response, to attempts to regulate
the tremendous amounts of money being spent in attempts to cap-
ture national office. In an opinion written by Justice Rehnquist,"s
the Court struck down a restriction in the Presidential Election
Campaign Fund Act (Fund Act)5" which provided that if a presi-
dential candidate of a major party chose to receive public funds for
52. Id. at 57.
53. In First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), the Court struck down a Massa-
chusetts law restricting contributions and expenditures of banks and corporations designed
to influence votes on questions submitted to voters, other than those questions affecting the
"business, property, or assets" of a bank or corporation. Id. at 767-68, 795. The Court held
that it was unconstitutional to restrict the speech of such entities on the simple basis of
their being corporations, stating that "[ilf the speakers here were not corporations, no one
would suggest that the state could silence their proposed speech." Id. at 777, 784-85. Justice
White, dissenting along with Justices Brennan and Marshall, argued that the purpose of the
statute was to prevent corporations from using their aggregation of wealth to unfair advan-
tage in the political process: "The State need not permit its own creation to consume it." Id.
at 809.
54. 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
55. Id. at 299.
56. Id.
57. 105 S. Ct. 1459 (1985).
58. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and O'Connor joined the opin-
ion of the Court. Justices Brennan and Stevens joined in Part II of the Court's opinion.
Justice Stevens filed a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice
White filed a dissenting opinion, in Part I of which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined.
Justice Marshall also filed a separate dissenting opinion.
59. 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9013 (1982).
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his general election campaign, 0 then campaign financing limita-
tions extended not only to his contributions and his expendi-
tures, 61 but also to independent expenditures by others on his be-
half 6 2  The challenged provision provided- that any such
independent expenditures of more than $1 thousand to a political
committee in furtherance of a candidate's campaign constituted a
criminal offense.6 3
In discussing the Court's consideration of the constitutionality of
these provisions of the Fund Act, it is important to first examine
some basics pertaining to such provisions. The Act applies only if a
presidential candidate accepts public financing of his general elec-
tion campaign.64 Thus, the Act imposes voluntary, not mandatory,
limitations. A candidate may decline the "carrot" offered to secure
his voluntary support for limitations on contributions and expendi-
tures. Also, the Act covers only the period from the nominating
convention to thirty days after the general election. 5
The voluntary nature of the limitations is of particular signifi-
cance. If a candidate elects to receive public funds for his cam-
paign, then he must agree that he will not accept other contribu-
tions.66 This is in contrast to the FECA, not reviewed by the Court
in NCPAC, which applies to all presidential campaigns, as well as
to other federal elections.6 7
As the Court noted in NCPAC, it had previously reviewed both
the Fund Act and FECA in Buckley. The limitations on contribu-
tions to candidates were upheld in Buckley while the limitations
on expenditures of independent organizations were struck down as
being unconstitutional."
The specific challenged provision in NCPAC was section
9012(f)(1) of the Fund Act, which provides:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any political committee which is not an
authorized committee with respect to the eligible candidates of a
political party for President and Vice President in a presidential
60. Id. § 9003.
61. Id. § 9012(a).
62. Id. § 9012(f).
63. Id.
64. Id. § 9003.
65. Id. § 9002(12)(A).
66. Id. § 9003.
67. See supra notes 30-53 and accompanying text. The FECA is not a voluntary scheme.
It applies to a candidate's campaign regardless of whether it is privately or publicly funded.
68. NCPAC, 105 S. Ct. at 1466.
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election knowingly and willfully to incur expenditures to further
the election of such candidates, which would constitute qualified
campaign expenses if incurred by an authorized committee of
such candidates, in an aggregate amount exceeding $1,000.69
"Political committee" is defined as "any committee, association, or
organization, whether or not incorporated, which accepts contribu-
tions or makes expenditures for the purpose of influencing, or at-
tempting to influence, the nomination or election of one or more
individuals to Federal, State, or local elective public office."'70 "Eli-
gible candidates" are those presidential and vice-presidential can-
didates who are eligible and have chosen to receive public funds.71
The Court did not question that the Political Action Committees
(PACs) were political committees, that the candidate whom they
supported, Ronald Reagan, was a qualified candidate, and that the
PACs' expenditures came within the definition of "qualified cam-
paign expense. '72 The remaining question was whether the statute
was constitutional.3
The Court found that the statute affected speech that is at the
core of the first amendment. 4 The Court recognized, however, that
the PACs were not "lone pamphleteers or street corner orators in
the Tom Paine mold. '7 The Court unquestionably understood
that the PACs spend large amounts of money in order to get their
position across to the public in election campaigns. While this
large expenditure of money certainly made things different, the
Court thought that "for purposes of presenting political views in
connection with a nationwide Presidential election, allowing the
presentation of views while forbidding the expenditure of more
than $1,000 to present them is much like allowing a speaker in a
public hall to express his views while denying him the use of an
amplifying system."76
The Court concluded that PACs such as these are entities which
enable large numbers of people to make their voices heard more
effectively. The Court rejected the idea that the manner of organi-
zation or the methods of solicitation of the PACs deprived them of
69. 26 U.S.C. § 9012(0(1).
70. 26 U.S.C. § 9002(9).
71. Id. §§ 9002(4), 9003.
72. NCPAC, 105 S. Ct. at 1466.
73. Id. at 1467.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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first amendment protection for their expenditures. The Court also
rejected the argument that the contributions to the PACs do not
constitute individual speech. The FEC asserted that if contribu-
tions are related to speech, then it is only "speech by proxy" be-
cause the individual contributors have no control over what the
PACs say or how they say it.7 The Court said that the statute
limits expenditures by the PACs, not the contributions they re-
ceive. 78 Also, in the Court's view, the contributions by individuals
to the PACs were predominantly small-an average of seventy-five
dollars for NCPAC; twenty-five dollars for Fund For A Conserva-
tive Majority-and did not raise the same concerns as would large
contributions. 79
Another reason the 'proxy speech' approach is not useful in this
case is that the contributors obviously like the message they are
hearing from these organizations and want to add their voices to
that message; otherwise they would not part with their money. To
say that their collective action in pooling their resources to am-
plify their voices is not entitled to full First Amendment protec-
tion would subordinate the voices of those of modest means as
opposed to those sufficiently wealthy to be able to buy expensive
media ads with their own resources.80
The Court briefly noted that this was not a "corporations" case
and that the Court did not reach the question of whether a corpo-
ration could constitutionally be restricted in the making of inde-
pendent expenditures in such circumstances. 81
The Court applied its standard first amendment analysis, look-
ing at whether the restriction on freedom of speech could be saved
by reason of a legitimate and compelling governmental interest.82
The Court noted that the only legitimate and compelling govern-
mental interests thus far identified were those of preventing cor-
ruption or the appearance of corruption, as found in Buckley and
Citizens Against Rent Control.3
In a demonstration of what can only be described as either judi-
77. Id. at 1467-68.
78. Id. at 1468.
79. Id. at 1467-68.
80. Id. at 1468.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1469.
83. Id.
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cial blindness or political naivete on the part of the majority,8' the
Court stated:
It is contended that, because the PACs may by the breadth of
their organizations spend larger amounts than the individuals in
Buckley, the potential for corruption is greater. But precisely
what the "corruption" may consist of we are never told with as-
surance. The fact that candidates and elected officials may alter
or reaffirm their own positions on issues in response to political
messages paid for by the PACs can hardly be called corruption,
for one of the essential features of democracy is the presentation
to the electorate of varying points of view. It is of course hypo-
thetically possible here, as in the case of the independent expend-
itures forbidden in Buckley, that candidates may take notice of
and reward those responsible for PAC expenditures by giving offi-
cial favors to the latter in exchange for the supporting messages.
But here, as in Buckley, the absence of prearrangement and coor-
dination undermines the value of the expenditure to the candi-
date, and thereby alleviates the danger that expenditures will be
given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the can-
didate. On this record, such an exchange of political favors for
uncoordinated expenditures remains a hypothetical possibility
and nothing more.85
The Court stated further that even were it determined that huge
expenditures by PACs were corruptive, the statute could not sur-
vive constitutional challenge because it is overbroad. The majority
found that it applied to NCPAC and to "informal discussion
groups that solicit neighborhood contributions to publicize their
views about a particular Presidential candidate.""6 Nor could the
statute be saved by a narrowing construction because it would be
too difficult to draw lines between large PACs and the informal
neighborhood groups.
In striking down the statute, the Court concluded:
Even assuming that Congress could fairly conclude that large-
scale PACs have a sufficient tendency to corrupt, the overbreadth
84. The Court had much evidence of coordination of the supposed "independent" ex-
penditures with campaigns of candidates before it. See infra note 128. It is the lack of coor-
dination which is the basis of the Court's holding here and this was severely criticized by
Justices White and Marshall in dissent. See infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
85. Id. at 1469.
86. Id. at 1470.
87. Id.
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of § 9012(f) in this case is so great that the section may not be
upheld. We are not quibbling over fine-tuning of prophylactic
limitations, but are concerned about wholesale restriction of
clearly protected conduct.ss
The dissenters took issue with the majority on several points,
among them the definition of the conduct of these PACs as
speech8 9 and the majority's assertion that the danger of corruption
of candidates by the PACs was merely a hypothetical possibility.
As Justice White stated:
The credulous acceptance of the formal distinction between co-
ordinated and independent expenditures blinks political reality.
That the PACs' expenditures are not formally "coordinated" is
too slender a reed on which to distinguish them from actual con-
tributions to the campaign. The candidate cannot help but know
of the extensive efforts "independently" undertaken on his be-
half. In this realm of possible tacit understandings and implied
agreements, I see no reason not to accept the congressional judg-
ment that so-called independent expenditures must be closely
regulated."
As in Buckley, I am convinced that it is pointless to limit the
amount that can be contributed to a candidate or spent with his
approval without also limiting the amounts that can be spent on
his behalf.91
Agreeing with Justice White, Justice Marshall stated:
It simply belies reality to say that a campaign will not reward
massive financial assistance provided in the only way that is le-
gally available. And the possibility of such a reward provides a
powerful incentive to channel an independent expenditure into an
area that a candidate will appreciate. Surely an eager supporter
will be able to discern a candidate's needs and desires; similarly, a
willing candidate will notice the supporter's efforts. To the extent
that individuals are able to make independent expenditures as
part of a quid pro quo, they succeed in undermining completely
88. Id. at 1471
89. Id. at 1475 (White, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 1476 (footnote omitted).
91. Id. (footnote omitted).
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the first rationale for the distinction made in Buckley.2
The NCPAC decision likely rendered ineffective all existing re-
strictions on expenditures by independent political committees.
This result, in turn, will undermine attempts at public financing of
campaigns and the limiting of contributions and expenditures. The
task facing proponents of public financing now is how constitution-
ally to find other ways of restricting private indirect expenditures
in political campaigns.
B. What Support for Campaign Financing Controls and Public
Financing Exists Within State Court Decisions?
Generally, within the parameters laid out by the Supreme Court,
state judicial opinions concerning limits on campaign contributions
and public financing of campaigns for various offices have been
favorable. The state courts which have ruled on such legislation
have not taken it upon themselves to go beyond Buckley and its
progeny to strike down either campaign financing limitations or
public financing systems.
1. Florida
While Florida does not have any elections financed with public
funds, its election laws include numerous and detailed provisions
on campaign financing.93 These include limitations on campaign
contributions, 94 campaign expenditures,95 and, in a post-Buckley
provision, even independent expenditures." Further, Florida has a
fully staffed, active Commission on Ethics, 97 which functions along
with other election officials to assure compliance with election
laws.
In Winn-Dixie Stores v. State,9 8 the Supreme Court of Florida
struck down the campaign financing limitation pertaining to Winn-
Dixie's expenditure of $24 thousand in a referendum campaign in
Dade County.9 Winn-Dixie sought to defeat an ordinance that
92. Id. at 1481 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
93. FLA. STAT. ch. 106 (1983).
94. Id. § 106.08.
95. Id. § 106.11.
96. Id. § 106.071.
97. Id. §9 112.320-.3241.
98. Winn-Dixie Stores v. State, 408 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1981).
99. Id. at 212. The court held that FIA. STAT. § 106.08(1)(e) (1974) was unconstitutional
as applied to the facts of that case to limit expenditures in issue-referendum campaigns. Id.
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would have prohibited the sale of beverages in nonreturnable con-
tainers.100 Winn-Dixie involved the same statute as did Let's Help
Florida v. McCrary,101 although Winn-Dixie was decided nearly a
year and a half after McCrary was settled in federal court. Al-
though the Supreme Court of Florida found "the reasoning and the
holding of McCrary to be directly applicable to the instant
case, ' ' 02 it still reviewed the arguments-essentially the same ones
presented in McCrary-before declaring the statute unconstitu-
tional. Much of the court's opinion, in fact, consisted of quotations
from McCrary.
The court did, however, note the statements made in McCrary
concerning Florida's disclosure laws that are effective and
constitutional:
Florida can and does effectively promote the disclosure of large
contributors through measures that are less harmful to first
amendment rights. For example, sections 106.03 and 106.07 of the
Florida Election Code require political committees to register
with the state and to file information about each contribution and
contributor throughout the campaign. This information is availa-
ble to the public and may be published through newspapers and
other media. Section 106.143 requires disclosure of the source of
payment for all political advertisements and campaign literature.
Measures such as these provide adequate disclosure without di-
rectly restricting contributions or other important first amend-
ment rights.1'"
2. Other States
In an advisory opinion handed down shortly after Buckley, the
Supreme Court of Michigan found unconstitutional the maximum
expenditure limits on campaigns and by individuals imposed by
statute.104 However, it upheld the constitutionality both of the lim-
100. Id. at 211.
101. Let's Help Florida v. McCrary, 621 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1980). In this case, the Fifth
Circuit held that FLA. STAT. § 106.08(1)(d), (e) (1977), was unconstitutional because, by
prohibiting contributions of more than $3 thousand to any political committee supporting or
opposing any issue to be decided in a statewide election, the statute abridged the first
amendment and could not be saved by reason of governmental interests in preventing cor-
ruption or promoting the disclosure of the identities of contributions to political campaigns.
Id. at 201.
102. Winn-Dixie, 408 So. 2d at 213.
103. Id. (quoting McCrary, 621 F.2d at 200-01).
104. Advisory Opinion On Constitutionality of 1975 PA 227 (Questions 2-10), 242
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itations on the size of contributions to a campaign and of the
Michigan system for public financing of gubernatorial races. 105
The court approved the public financing scheme and found the
following "beneficial public purposes":
1. To allow gubernatorial candidates to become less dependent
upon financial support from special-interest groups, thus promot-
ing the appearance and reality of an executive with the welfare of
the public at large in mind.
2. To encourage greater participation in gubernatorial cam-
paigns by reducing financial obstacles for candidates with less
fundraising abilities, and by enhancing the importance of smaller
contributions.
3. To promote the dissemination of political ideas to the electo-
rate by gubernatorial candidates who have been encouraged to
campaign for the governorship. 06
In a brief opinion handed down at the beginning of 1977, the
Supreme Court of Georgia struck down expenditure limitations in
certain political campaigns, strictly following the Buckley
opinion. 10 7
In Common Cause v. New Jersey Election Law Enforcement
Commission,'0 8 the Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld a statute
that prohibits all contributions greater than $600 to candidates for
governor in the general election. 09
In a 1981 advisory opinion, 10 the Supreme Court of New Hamp-
shire upheld the constitutionality of a proposed plan for partial
public financing of campaigns for governor and governor's counsel
which set spending limits only for those candidates who accept
public financing. The court cited Buckley, saying that the Supreme
Court had upheld such voluntarily assumed limitations."' The
court specifically ruled that a proposed amendment to the bill
which would have deleted the public financing, but left the spend-
ing limitation intact, would have been unconstitutional." 2
N.W.2d 3, 10 (Mich. 1976).
105. Id. at 9-12.
106. Id. at 16.
107. State Ethics Comm'n v. McDowell, 231 S.E.2d 734 (Ga. 1977).
108. Common Cause v. New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Comm'n, 377 A.2d 643
(N.J. 1977).
109. Id. at 651.
110. Opinion of the Justices, 430 A.2d 1137 (N.H. 1981).
111. Id. at 1138.
112. Id. at 1139.
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In a 1984 decision, the Court of Appeals of Michigan in Jacobs v.
Headlee"' ruled that the restriction of the gubernatorial campaign
public financing plan to candidates of major political parties did
not violate the state constitutional rights of minor party candi-
dates. The court concluded that the legislation was rationally re-
lated to legitimate governmental objectives and did not violate the
plaintiff's rights of due process, equal protection, purity of elec-
tions, or free speech under the Michigan constitution." 4
IV. EMPHASIS ON THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF PUBLIC FINANCING
AND THE GOALS OF CAMPAIGN FINANCING REFORMS
Approximately 500,000 public officials are elected in the United
States during a four-year period.11 5 The sums spent on the cam-
paigns are not insignificant."' In fact, the amounts spent by the
winning candidates alone show that the candidates and their sup-
porters certainly do not pursue political office for the salaries paid
by the jobs.117
The response by federal and state legislatures in enacting re-
forms to deal with the corrupting influences of large sums of
money on elected officials and the counter-response by the judici-
ary may become a characteristic of American campaign financing
for a number of years until it dynamically shapes public financing
laws that will eventually become part of the accepted framework of
elections in America. On the other hand, public financing as one of
the weapons in the government's arsenal for combatting corruptive
influences in politics may become a rusting artifact on some forgot-
ten stockpile. The goals of the reforms of the 1970's are clear
enough. All the reforms work together to reduce corruption or the
appearance of corruption.
Several reforms have fared well with the courts.1 8 More impor-
tantly, the Supreme Court's ruling in NCPAC can only exacerbate
the problems which must be solved. The potential for more corrup-
tion and, almost certainly, an increase in the appearance of corrup-
tion lie ahead for American elections in the near future because of
the ever-increasing sums of special interest money being expended
outside candidates' campaign treasuries.
113. Jacobs v. Headlee, 352 N.W.2d 721 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
114. Id. at 724-27.
115. H. ALEXANDER, 3d ed., supra note 9, at 180.
116. See supra note 12.
117. Id.
118. See supra notes 29-114 and accompanying text.
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All the various reforms aim clearly at the evil influence of
money, either directly or indirectly. Collectively, these reforms in
campaign financing attack corruption or the appearance of corrup-
tion and have the following goals in mind:
(1) achieving a well-informed electorate;
(2) minimizing the influence of money on the outcome of an
election;
(3) minimizing the influence of money as a quid pro quo for
certain action by a politician;
(4) encouraging qualified candidates to run for office (regardless
of their personal wealth or their willingness to sell themselves to
groups who will pay to secure their election);
(5) reducing the dollar cost of elections.119
Public financing works hand-in-glove with the other reforms to
achieve these goals by providing a minimum or "floor" of funds for
serious candidates to educate voters; by reducing the need for the
candidate to secure funds from contributors, at whatever cost in
terms of political ties and commitments; by helping candidates ad-
vertise their greater independence as a vote-getting strategy which
compensates for rejected contributions; and by evening the finan-
cial differences between candidates regardless of personal wealth.
Public financing may reduce the costs for campaigns in which the
acceptance of public funds carries with it limitations on expendi-
tures, especially when the limitations remain reasonable for the of-
fice sought and when failure to honor the limitations would result
in a degree of public outrage which could defeat a candidate who
relies too heavily on large contributions.120
Because analyses of the various approaches of current public fi-
nancing systems have already been conducted, it will suffice to say
that many variables exist. These variables include questions per-
taining to the particular elections to be financed; the source of
funding; the amounts to be allocated; the manner of determining
which candidates shall receive the benefits of public funding; how
public funds may be spent; the administration of the public financ-
ing system; the timing of payments; the extent to which limitations
on contributions and expenditures shall be conditions for receipt of
public funds; the extent that legislative attempts will be made to
119. For further elaboration, see H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLmCS: MONEY, ELECTIONS
AND POLTICAL REFORM (1st ed. 1976).
120. See, e.g., H. ALEXANDER, 3d ed., supra note 9.
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regulate and control private indirect expenditures; and sanctions
for violation of the public financing legislation.
V. THE PROBLEM OF PRIVATE INDIRECT EXPENDITURES
The Supreme Court's holdings on independent expenditures
place a tremendous challenge before Congress and the state legisla-
tures. If public financing of elections is to remain viable as one of
the weapons for combating the corrupting influences of money in
politics, then public financing legislation must recognize the depth
of the problem.
The task is to determine if public financing of elections can work
effectively either (1) with no accompanying attempt to impose lim-
itations on private indirect expenditures or (2) only with new and
more imaginative attempts to impose such limitations. Congress
did enact a number of amendments to the Funding Act after the
Buckley decision.121 Those amendments did not, however, sway the
antilimitations majority of the Court in NCPAC.
Some states enacted public financing laws that do not seek to
limit expenditures, while others imposed limitations only upon
candidates who accept public funds. 122 Thus, while many may
share the philosophy expressed by the dissenters in NCPAC, pub-
lic funding does continue to exist, notwithstanding the open door
to private expenditures to undermine public funding systems.
Whether or not a state legislature makes a new attempt to pro-
hibit coordinated private indirect expenditures when considering a
particular system for public funding of elections, it can impose new
disclosure laws to focus public attention on indirect expenditures
by well-financed special interest groups. After the Buckley deci-
sion, for example, Congress required that independent expendi-
tures of $1 thousand or more made within fifteen days of an elec-
tion be reported within twenty-four hours; required persons and
PACs making independent expenditures of more than $100 to file a
report with the election commission; required the person or PAC
making the report to state, under penalty of perjury, that the ex-
penditure was not made in collusion with a candidate; and stiff-
ened the penalties for violations of the law.123
Legislatures should note, in considering new approaches to limit-
ing indirect expenditures, that the Supreme Court did not recog-
121. H. ALEXANDER, 3d ed., supra note 9, at 42-45.
122. See supra note 25.
123. Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475 (1976).
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nize an absolute right to spend unlimited amounts.124 Thus, after
PACs figuratively have purchased their costly amplifying systems
and put them into operation to make their voices heard through-
out the public halls of America, they should not presume that the
courts will invalidate all legislative efforts to control the decibel
level of their political messages. 125
The Supreme Court will uphold legislative restrictions upon
campaign financing if such restrictions prevent "corruption or the
appearance of corruption. ' 126 The inconsistency lies in the Court's
apparent simultaneous acceptance of NCPAC's expenditures as
"uncoordinated with the candidate or his campaign. "127 This is
contrary to the overwhelming evidence of coordination and even
design to circumvent the limitations which the organization
disliked. 1128
124. The Court's opinion in NCPAC was premised on the finding that the PACs' spend-
ing was independent. A finding of non-independence could lead to a different result.
125. NCPAC, 105 S. Ct. at 1469.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. The Democrats in NCPAC stated:
As the former Executive Director of FCM, a PAC which expended over two mil-
lion dollars supporting a presidential candidate in 1980, is reported to have de-
scribed it, the result is "a little dance." "[W]e dance around the law in a way that
never breaks the letter but breaks the spirit of the law-but we don't agree with
the law anyway."
Brief for Appellants Democratic Party of the United States and the Democratic National
Committee at 3, Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm.,
105 S. Ct. 1459 (1985) (quoting remarks of Paul Dietrich in THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 13,
1982, at 91) (footnotes omitted).
The Federal Elections Commission in NCPAC stated:
[I]t is clear that the efforts of these independent committees were considered
helpful by the candidate, and that the Reagan Administration was appreciative.
For example, individuals associated with the committees received presidential ap-
pointments, and NCPAC was able to obtain closed door briefings with members of
the Reagan cabinet, as well as the President himself, to aid in its fundraising
efforts.
Brief for Appellant Federal Election Commission at 25, id. (citations omitted).
The joint appendix submitted by the parties stipulated that the press had reported meet-
ings of several Reagan cabinet officers with NCPAC officials in off-the-record policy brief-
ings. These cabinet officials at the time included John Block, Secretary of Agriculture, Rich-
ard Schweiker, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Drew Lewis, Secretary of
Transportation, James Watt, Secretary of the Interior, and James Edwards, Secretary of
Energy. Joint Appendix at 32-33, id.
As further evidence of coordination and close relations between the PACs and the candi-
dates' campaigns, Frank Donatelli, a founder and former Director-at-Large of NCPAC, was
the Midwest coordinator for the Reagan for President Committee in 1980. Roger Stone, a
founder and the original treasurer of NCPAC, was the Northeast coordinator for the Reagan
campaign in 1980. Joint Appendix at 36-37, id.
The Washington Post has quoted John T. Dolan, head of NCPAC, as saying: "[G]roups
886 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:863
The Court's emphasis on "absence of prearrangement and coor-
dination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent," which
it felt undermined "the value of the expenditure to the candidate"
and also alleviated "the danger that expenditures will be given as a
quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate,"
seems inappropriate in light of the history of NCPAC. 129 In 1979,
the National Committee for an Effective Congress (NCEC) filed a
complaint with the FEC about NCPAC and two other PACs
formed respectively by three presidential candidates to compli-
ment their campaign committees. NCEC asserted that NCPAC
and its candidate's campaign committee were one and the same
because they were established, maintained, and controlled by the
same people and because a substantial portion of the contributors
to the presidential committee gave to NCPAC as well. 130 Professor
Alexander summarized these events by saying: "By establishing
qualified committees, the ... presidential hopefuls and their sup-
porters were able to avoid the individual contribution limits....
Moreover, the presidential hopeful could raise and spend without
consideration for the maximum spending limits."''
Although one may join with the dissenting justices in NCPAC in
near outrage at the majority's perspective, the most constructive
approaches are linked with the majority's perspective. Little will
be accomplished in terms of creating viable public financing sys-
tems if public financing advocates throw up their collective hands
and wail that public financing cannot work under the parameters
set by the Court.
If other cases, brought in state court instead of federal court,
present similar instances of massive indirect private political ex-
penditures of such magnitude that they frustrate one or more of
the basic purposes for the existence of a particular state public fi-
nancing system, and if similar evidence is offered on prearrange-
ment or coordination, then state courts may make factual findings
that justify different results. The result may be that the expendi-
tures are not constitutionally protected because they were coordi-
like ours [NCPAC and other political committees making independent expenditures] are
potentially very dangerous to the political process. We could be a menace, yes. Ten indepen-
dent expenditure groups, for example, could amass this great amount of money and defeat
the point of accountability in politics." Joint Appendix at 35, id. (quoting Washington Post,
Aug. 10, 1980, at Fl, col.1).
129. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47.
130. H. ALEXANDER, 2d ed., supra note 9, at 90.
131. Id. at 89.
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nated with the candidate, who agreed in accepting public money to
limit his expenditures. For this reason alone, candidates and inter-
est groups who would subvert a public financing system at the
state level may find that they must watch their steps. To make
such favorable results in state courts possible, laws regulating pri-
vate indirect expenditures should make clear that only those pri-
vate indirect expenditures which are truly independent and unco-
ordinated will be protected. New laws should provide sanctions
against persons or PACs whose indirect expenditures do not mea-
sure up to legislatively defined standards for "independent" ex-
penditures. The role of the courts would then be to scrutinize the
legislatively drawn lines.
A. Distinguishing Between Types of Elections for a Public
Financing System
The campaigns for President of the United States receive the
most attention because of the importance of the office, the ease of
inserting numerous and varied issues into the campaign, and the
large amounts of money required to run an effective campaign. It
may be incorrect to assume that private indirect expenditures,
whether or not truly "independent," are less threatening in cam-
paigns for most elected public offices than in the presidential cam-
paigns. However, public financing of certain elections will have in-
herently fewer problems with private indirect expenditures than
other methods of financing. For example, elections of Florida's
trial judges seem to provide one such example.
Florida elects its trial judges in nonpartisan campaigns.1 32 Flor-
ida's appellate judges do not face opponents in elections, but face
merit retention elections."" The separate chapter of the Florida
election laws dealing with these "non-partisan elections of judicial
officers" imposes a number of "limitations on political activity" of
candidates for judgeships.""4 In this particular type of election
which seems to be less susceptible to subversion of public funding
from private indirect expenditures, the additional high ethical
standards have high visibility. The existing laws impose criminal
sanctions for violations in order to prohibit partisan political activ-
ity by third parties on behalf of a candidate."3 5
132. FLA. STAT. § 105.071 (1983).
133. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 10(a).
134. FLA. STAT. § 105.071 (1983).
135. Id. § 105.09.
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At the outset of any legislative consideration of the problems of
the relationship between public financing and independent ex-
penditures, proponents of a public financing system should ex-
amine the nature of the particular campaign being financed. 3 ' For
example, electioneering by each candidate seeking to become a
trial judge in Florida continues to present serious problems for the
candidates, their contributors, and the general public in terms of
the unfortunate opportunities for an appearance of corruption.
Most candidates for judicial office and their contributors regret the
fact that most of the money for such candidates comes from the
very lawyers, courthouse personnel, court reporters, and other
court-related businessmen who know the candidates. While these
contributors provide an accurate measure of the strength of feeling
of the people most involved with the judicial system on a day-to-
day basis and also provide a measure of the competence and ability
of the candidates, they are also the persons most able to benefit
from corruption within the system, thus leading to an appearance
of corruption.
The general public probably relies considerably on such judicial
personnel and their opinions in deciding on how to vote; but, at
the same time, the common voter also seems justified in raising an
eyebrow wherr he knows that Lawyer A gave Judge B a $1 thou-
sand contribution and just happens to have a law practice that
puts him in front of Judge B several days each month.
In nonpartisan judicial elections and others similar to them,
public financing helps everyone involved: the candidates, the per-
sons who provide most of the money for the campaigns, and the
voters. It is possible to end forever the worry of the litigant who
knows that the other party's lawyer contributed to the judge's
campaign or that his own lawyer supported the judge's opponent.
B. Shifting the Burden to the Power Brokers
A shifting of the burden to the big spenders is appropriate. Leg-
136. The appendix to this Article continues the example of Florida's trial judges by pro-
posing specific legislation for establishing a public financing system for these particular judi-
cial officers. One of the co-authors of this Article, Tom Moore, was the prime sponsor of a
similar bill, HB 614, in the 1977 Regular Session. That bill passed the House Committee on
Elections. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 522 (Reg. Sess. 1977). The proposal in the appendix reflects up-
dated thinking on how best to implement a public financing system following the more re-
cent Supreme Court opinions and the experience of other public financing systems in gen-
eral. The data available today is not likely to be different from that gathered in 1977 to
support the basic arguments in favor of the public financing of elections for Florida's trial
judges.
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islative bodies can draw lines which reasonably safeguard public
financing systems, such as through stronger disclosure provisions
for indirect expenditures. There should be no assumption that
those who make substantial private indirect expenditures in pub-
licly financed elections do so without coordination of those expend-
itures with the candidate, or in a manner which does not make a
mockery of the public financing system involved.
What is suggested here is more than simply that legislation
should include sanctions against those who would frustrate the
public funding through indirect expenditures which are not the in-
dependent expenditures protected by the first amendment. Every
public financing law should include sections similar to the follow-
ing that define and regulate private indirect expenditures and set
forth statutory presumptions to aid in the prosecution of violations
of the law:
Indirect expenditure.-Any expenditure not made from campaign
funds of a candidate, other than an expentiture made directly to
or in favor of a candidate as a campaign contribution, made by
any person or political action committee in favor of or in opposi-
tion to any candidate, is an indirect expenditure for purposes of
this Act.
Prohibition of coordinated expenditures.-It shall be unlawful
for any person or political action committee to make any indirect
expenditure which he or it coordinated with a candidate.
Presumptions as to coordination of expenditures.
(1) Any person or political action committee who or which
makes an indirect expenditure or expenditures in any election in
which he or it has actively campaigned for a candidate during and
in such contest, shall be be rebuttably presumed to be engaged in
campaign financing activities coordinated with the campaign of
the candidate.
(2) Any person or political action committee who or which con-
tributes directly to a candidate and thereafter makes an indirect
expenditure or expenditures in favor of election of that candidate
or advocating defeat of his oponent, which when added together
exceed the maximum amount allowed by law to be contributed
directly to the candidate, shall be rebuttably presumed to be en-
gaged in campaign financing activities coordinated with the cam-
paign of the candidate.
The above distinction in the proposed statutory language be-
tween indirect expenditures and independent expenditures, the
former including the latter, should be emphasized. The reason for
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the distinction lies in the perceived need for regulation and control
of all indirect expenditures, especially coordinated ones.137
A citizen who simply exercises his constitutionally protected
right to "independently" spend his money in excess of contribution
limits has little to fear from such legislation and possible prosecu-
tion if his own testimony as to lack of coordination is credible. The
target of criminal prosecution is the person whom the prosecutor
can link closely with the candidate and who has said to state wit-
nesses that he did coordinate his expenditure. Such circumvention
of the campaign financing laws should not go unpunished, pro-
vided the public financing law appears to the court in all other
respects to establish reasonable and proper levels of support for
the candidate's campaign and his acceptance of limitations on
expenditures.
By including the above proposed statutory provisions in a public
financing act, the legislative body necessarily accepts that it must
clearly spell out its intent if its provisions are to constitutionally
restrict indirect expenditures. While the Supreme Court itself es-
tablished the concept of "independent" expenditures "uncoordi-
nated" with the candidate, 38 the legislative effort should tie the
lack of independence and coordination to the goals of preventing
corruption or an appearance of corruption in the publicly financed
election process. The statutory presumptions are corollaries to the
substantive provisions of the act defining the offense and are not
unknown in criminal law.139
No doubt many other variations for limitations exist. These vari-
ables are suggested as viable choices among those upon which the
courts hopefully will look favorably.
137. The Florida Legislature, for example, thought that it had dealt with the problem of
indirect expenditures in a 1977 post-Buckley amendment to its campaign financing laws.
Florida's election code was amended to define "independent expenditures" and require a
disclosure in the political advertisement by the person making the expenditure both of his
name and address, together with his statement that the expenditure was made "indepen-
dently of any candidate." FLA. STAT. § 106.071 (1983). Failure to include this disclosure con-
stitutes a first-degree misdemeanor in Florida. Id. The problem, however, is that the Florida
law very clearly defines an independent expenditure, as expected, as one that is "not con-
trolled by, coordinated with, or made upon consultation with, any candidate, political com-
mittee, or agent of such candidate or committee." Id. § 106.011(5). Thus, while the intent of
the existing Florida law may have been directed at imposing disclosure requirements upon
all indirect expenditures, it does not clearly do so.
138. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46-48 (1975).
139. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 812.022 (1983) (possession of stolen property).
FINANCING PUBLIC ELECTIONS
VI. CONCLUSION
With the NCPAC presidential public financing decision in
March, 1985, the United States Supreme Court confirmed that it
was listening to those whose money talks the loudest in America.
Unfortunately, the Court almost flippantly accepted the expendi-
tures by the PACs as independent-not coordinated with the pres-
idential candidate's campaign-speech entitled to first amendment
protection. Money does talk. Now, more clearly, freedom of speech
and freedom of association, according to the Court's majority, per-
mit big money to talk big to America's politicians.
The opinion of the Court exists as a challenge to Congress and
the state legislatures to deal effectively with massive funding by
powerful political action committees. It still remains to be seen
whether public financing of elections has a real future in the Amer-
ican electoral process. There is doubt that any public financing
system can work effectively without being substantially under-
mined by Court-protected "independent" expenditures. Neverthe-
less, some states are trying. Public funding without limitations on
expenditures outside the candidate's campaign treasury (consistent
with the Court's position) may help.
Some public financing systems may succeed where others fail
simply by virtue of the nature of the elections being publicly
funded, such as nonpartisan elections of trial judges in Florida.
Perhaps as the result of new legislative offensives, it will be possi-
ble, with judicial support, to distinguish between truly "indepen-
dent" expenditures and those expenditures coordinated with a can-
didate. Future judicial decisions may support such legislatively
backed reasonable candidate-accepted limitations on contributions
and expenditures.
Until then, Buckley and NCPAC remain as significant legal im-
pediments to the goals of campaign financing reforms. It appears
that campaign financing limitations on expenditures outside the
campaign fund of the candidate, while more controllable in state
public financing systems, will not be upheld without careful
draftsmanship.
Florida should consider public financing as a still viable weapon
for combatting corruption and the appearance of corruption in the
electoral process; but, it should cautiously proceed in areas that are
less controversial and less likely to produce large PAC indirect
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expenditures. 140
As PACs speak more loudly in future elections, the political re-
verberations may become deafening. Campaign financing excesses,
when equated with free speech, too often produce merely clanging
cymbals. Perhaps when the noise becomes unbearable, jurists will
proclaim another version of Justice Holmes' famous passage about
yelling "Fire!" in a crowded theater.141
140. A proposed bill pertaining to public financing of nonpartisan elections of Florida's
trial judges appears as an appendix beginning on the next page.
141. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). Justice Holmes stated:
[T]he character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.
The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely
shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. . . . The question in every case is
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature
as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive
evils that Congress has a right to prevent.
Id. (citations omitted).
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APPENDIX
Proposed Bill
A bill to be entitled
An act relating to campaign financing; creating part II of
chapter 106, Florida Statutes, the "Florida Trial Judges
Campaign Financing Act," providing for partial public fi-
nancing of nonpartisan elections of trial judges; stating leg-
islative intent; providing definitions; creating the Florida
Trial Judges Campaign Trust Fund and providing that all
qualifying fees paid by candidates for judicial office shall be
deposited therein; providing for expenditure limitations on
candidates for trial judge who accept public moneys;
prohibiting coordination of indirect expenditures; creating a
presumption pertaining to coordination of expenditures;
providing powers and duties of the Secretary of State; pro-
viding procedures, including a petitioning process, whereby
such candidates may become qualified to direct that pay-
ment be made from the Fund for certain qualified cam-
paign expenditures; providing for verification of petitions as
provided by law and for reimbursement of verification costs
as provided by law; providing for determination of qualifi-
cation by Secretary of State; providing for disbursement of
funds; amending s. 105.031(3), Florida Statutes, relating to
qualification fees for candidates for judicial office, to con-
form to this act; providing for relationship to other laws;
providing an effective date.
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:
Section 1. Chapter 106, Florida Statutes, is designated as part I
of chapter 106, and part II of chapter 106, Florida Statutes, con-
sisting of sections 106.50, 106.51, 106.52, 106.53, 106.54, 106.55,
106.56, 106.57, 106.58, 106.59, 106.60, and 106.61, Florida Statutes,
is created to read:
106.50 Short title.-This part shall be known and may be cited
as the "Florida Trial Judges Campaign Financing Act."
106.51 Legislative Intent.-The Florida Legislature recognizes
both (a) the existence of constitutionally protected rights of citi-
zens to spend their private funds to promote the election of candi-
dates whom they support; and (b) the need to minimize the cor-
rupting influence of money in the election of public officials. By its
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enactment of this part, the Legislature seeks to achieve the latter
without infringement upon the former, as both relate specifically
to candidates for trial judge. The Legislature affirms its intent to
safeguard the independence of the trial judges of this state, which
independence the Legislature finds to be of great importance in
maintaining the highest possible degree of integrity in our legal
system. The Legislature supports the continuation of our system of
nonpartisan elections of trial judges, including the provisions of
chapter 105 which establish limits upon campaign financing activi-
ties in elections for judicial office which limitations are in addition
to those limitations provided in part I of this chapter. The Legisla-
ture intends through this part to reduce the pressures on candi-
dates for trial judge to raise campaign funds from private sources,
to assist such candidates in funding their campaigns consistent
with the extra limitations imposed on candidates for judicial office
and to broaden the spectrum of citizen participation and candi-
date-voter contact in the selection of trial judges in this state.
106.52 Definitions.-As used in this part, unless the context
.clearly indicates otherwise:
(1) "Recipient candidate" means any candidate who has received
certification from the Secretary of State as having complied with
the requirements of the petitioning process of this part.
(2) "Qualified expenditure" means any expenditure subject to
direct payment by the state from public funds upon direction of a
recipient candidate, and limited to the following:
(a) Payments to the news media, including newspaper, televi-
sion, and radio establishments, for political advertisement of the
candidacy of the recipient candidate.
(b) Payments to printers, artists, publishers, and the like, for
creation and production of political literature for the political ad-
vertisement of the candidacy of the recipient candidate.
(c) Payments to a Board of County Commissioners or other ap-
propriate county government official to secure voter lists for use in
distributing political literature about the candidacy of the recipi-
ent candidate.
(d) Payments to any United States postmaster for costs of post-
age for mailing political literature about the candidacy of the re-
cipient candidate to prospective voters.
(3) "Public funds" means those funds collected from candidates
for election to nonpartisan judicial offices from qualification fees
required by law and deposited with the Secretary of State into the
Florida Trial Judges Campaign Trust Fund, established pursuant
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to s. 106.53.
(4) "Secretary" means the Secretary of State or such official
within the Department of State as he may designate to perform his
functions under this part.
(5) "Indirect expenditure" means any expenditure not made
from campaign funds of a candidate, other than an expenditure
made directly to or in favor of the campaign of a candidate as a
campaign contribution, made by any person or political action
committee in favor of or in opposition to any candidate for trial
judge.
(6) "Coordinated expenditure" means any indirect expenditure
made by any person or political action committee which he or it
coordinated with a candidate for trial judge.
106.53 Florida Trial Judge Campaign Trust Fund.-
(1) There is created the Florida Trial Judge Campaign Trust
Fund. All qualifying fees paid to the Department of State pursuant
to s. 105.031(3) by candidates for election to nonpartisan judicial
office shall be deposited in the fund.
(2) The Secretary of State shall have supervisory duty and au-
thority over the fund. The secretary shall cause all moneys paid
into the fund to be maintained in a separate account for disburse-
ment in accordance with this part.
(3) No public funds administered under this part by the secre-
tary shall be disbursed directly to any candidate. All payments
from the fund shall be to the person to whom payment is directed
by a recipient candidate for qualified expenditures or to a Board of
County Commissioners for reimbursement of verification costs in
accordance with s. 106.58.
106.54 Limitation on total expenditures by candidate.-No can-
didate for election to trial judge who receives benefits under this
part, nor any person acting on behalf of such candidate and with
his knowledge, shall expend any funds or incur any obligation on
behalf of his election in excess of an amount equal to one-half of
the annual salary of the office sought. Such limitation on total ex-
penditures during the campaign applies to all funds spent on be-
half of the election of the candidate, including public moneys spent
in accordance with his direction as set forth in this part.
106.55 Prohibition of coordinated expenditures.-
(1) It shall be unlawful for any person or political action com-
mittee to make any indirect expenditure which he or it coordinated
with a candidate for trial judge.
(2) Violation of this section shall constitute a first degree misde-
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meanor, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
106.56 Presumptions as to coordinated expenditures.-
(1) Any person or political action committee who or which fails
to publicly assert at the time of making an indirect expenditure
that it is being made independently of any candidate shall be
rebuttably presumed to be engaged in campaign financing activi-
ties coordinated with a candidate.
(2) Any person or political action committee who or which con-
tributes directly to a candidate for trial judge and thereafter makes
an indirect expenditure or expenditures in favor of election of that
candidate or advocating defeat of his opponent, which, when added
together, exceed the maximum amount allowed by law to be con-
tributed directly to the candidate, shall be rebuttably presumed to
be engaged in campaign financing activities coordinated with the
campaign of the candidate.
(3) Any person or political action committee who or which makes
an indirect expenditure or expenditures in any election for trial
judge in which he or it has actively campaigned for a candidate
during and in such contest, shall be rebuttably presumed to be en-
gaged in campaign financing activities coordinated with the cam-
paign of a candidate in such election.
106.57 Entitlement to public funds; petitioning process.-
(1) Each candidate for election to trial judge may seek the bene-
fits to his candidacy offered under this part.
(2) No candidate shall receive benefits under this part unless he
shall have first qualified as a candidate under s. 105.031.
(3) Each candidate seeking benefits under this part shall file a
written statement with the Secretary of State, stating that he in-
tends to seek certification from the secretary as a recipient candi-
date under this part.
(a) Such statement shall be filed at any time after noon of the
112th day prior to the first primary, but no later than noon of the
63rd day prior to the first primary.
(b) The secretary shall prescribe the form to be used in adminis-
tering and filing such statement. No signatures shall be obtained
by a candidate on any petitions hereunder until he has filed the
statement prescribed herein.
(4) When a candidate has filed the statement prescribed in sub-
section (3), the secretary shall forthwith provide the candidate
with forms in sufficient numbers to facilitate the gathering of sig-
natures. The candidate may immediately seek signatures thereon
to entitle his candidacy to the benefits of this part.
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(5) Only signatures of electors registered to vote in the geograph-
ical entity represented by the office sought shall count toward ob-
taining the minimum number of signatures prescribed. A separate
petition shall be circulated for each county from which signatures
are sought.
(6) The secretary shall prescribe the form of the petitions, which
shall include the following:
(a) The name of the candidate.
(b) The office sought.
(c) The fact that such petition is being circulated to entitle the
candidacy of the person circulating the petition to the benefits of
use of public funds for payment of qualified expenditures in his
campaign for the office sought.
(d) The county within which the particular petition is being
circulated.
(7) The signatures of the requisite number of registered electors
of the geographical entity represented by the office sought must be
obtained in order for a candidate to become certified by the secre-
tary as a recipient candidate under this part. The requisite number
of registered electors whose signatures must be obtained is the
lesser of:
(a) For the office of judge of a Circuit Court: 4,000;
(b) For the office of judge of County Court: 3,000; or a 3 percent
of the total number of registered electors of the geographical entity
represented by the office sought. The total number of registered
electors of the geographical entity represented by the office sought
is that number shown by the compilation of the Department of
State at the most recent general election.
(8) Each candidate shall file his petitions with the supervisor of
elections of the county in which such petitions were circulated,
such filing to occur not later than the first date for qualifying for
office.
106.58 Entitlement; verification of petitions.-
(1) Each supervisor of elections to whom a petition is submitted
pursuant to s. 106.57(8) shall file a report with the secretary no
later than 5 days after the last date for qualifying of candidates.
(2) Such report shall contain:
(a) A list of all candidates filing petitions under this part.
(b) A verification of the number of registered electors of the par-
ticular geographical entity represented by the office sought whose
signatures are on the petitions submitted by each candidate.
(c) The cost of verification of each candidate's petitions.
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(3) Petitions shall be verified as provided by the elections law.
106.59 Entitlement; certification.-
(1) The secretary shall determine whether the required number
of authorized signatures have been obtained to entitle a candidate
to certification as a recipient candidate under this part. Such de-
termination shall be made and reported to each affected candidate
within 10 days after the last date for qualifying of candidates. The
notice to each candidate shall include information on the amount
of public funds which may be used to benefit his candidacy as de-
termined under s. 106.61.
(2) It shall be a valid determination that the number of required
signatures have been obtained if the numbers reported to the sec-
retary total the required number for the geographical entity repre-
sented by the office sought.
(3) It shall be a valid determination that the number of required
signatures have not been obtained if the numbers reported to the
secretary do not total the required number for the geographical en-
tity represented by the office sought.
106.60 Verification costs; reimbursement.-
(1) No fee shall be charged to any candidate filing a petition
pursuant to this part, except as may be provided by law.
(2) The secretary shall reimburse the cost of verification of peti-
tions required by this part to the Board of County Commissioners
of each county whose supervisor filed a report on verified petitions
with the secretary. The reimbursement shall be in an amount
equal to 10 cents for each registered voter whose signature was ver-
ified to the secretary as appearing on petitions submitted to the
supervisor of such county, or the actual cost of verification, which-
ever is less.
(3) The sums reimbursed shall be paid from the Florida Trial
Judges Campaign Trust Fund, unless such fund should be ex-
hausted by disbursements to recipient candidates under s. 106.61.
In the latter event, reimbursement shall be from the General Reve-
nue Fund.
106.61 Public funds; disbursement.-
(1) Public funds shall be disbursed by the secretary according to
the office sought and according to group where multiple judicial
offices are to be filled. If two or more recipient candidates contest
the same office against each other, then the secretary shall evenly
divide the public funds apportioned to the election for that office
between the recipient candidates seeking that office. Apportion-
ment of public funds, according to the office sought, shall be made
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as follows for each contest in which one or more of the candidates
received certification by the secretary as a recipient candidate:
(a) Each contested election for the office of judge of a Circuit
court: $15,000.
(b) Each contested election for the office of judge of a County
Court: $10,000.
(2) Each recipient candidate shall provide written directions to
the secretary no later than 5 days prior to the first nonpartisan
election, specifying:
(a) The names and addresses of the payees to whom the secre-
tary shall direct public funds.
(b) The amount of public funds to be paid to each specified
payee.
(c) The nature of the qualified expenditure, in sufficient detail to
identify the particular political advertisement or expenditure.
(3) The secretary shall disburse public funds in accordance with
the written directions of each recipient candidate, upon the secre-
tary's satisfaction that the payees, amounts, and nature of quali-
fied expenditures are in accord with the requirements of this part,
and all other provisions of the election code.
(4) No later than December 1 of each general election year, or
within 30 days after any special election for a nonpartisan judicial
office affected by this part, the secretary shall pay, or cause to be
paid, the reimbursements for verification costs as authorized by s.
106.60.
(5) The secretary shall promulgate rules consistent with this part
to govern partial public financing of any special nonpartisan elec-
tion for judicial office not governed by existing provisions of this
part.
Section 2. Subsection (3) of section 105.031, Florida Statutes, is
amended to read:
105.031 Qualification; filing fee; oath of office.-
(3) QUALIFYING FEE.-Each candidate qualifying for judicial
office shall pay the Division of Elections a qualifying fee of 5 per-
cent of the annual salary of the office to which he seeks election.
The Division of Elections shall deposit all such qualifying fees in
the Florida Trial Judges Campaign Trust Fund in accordance
with s. 106.52. forwar.d all such qualifyig f to the. Dep.t.... ..
of Reqvenuet fiji de~posit ij1 the Ge11e14l Revenue Fa 1ds,.
Section 3. Nothing in this act shall preclude the application of
the provisions of chapter 105 or chapter 106, part I, Florida Stat-
utes, to nonpartisan elections for trial judges, unless such provi-
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sions are clearly inconsistent with the provisions of this act.
Section 4. No public funds shall be disbursed under this act un-
til the sums received as qualifying fees from candidates for judicial
office have been deposited into the Florida Trial Judges Campaign
Trust Fund in an amount which exceeds that amount which is re-
quired by this act to provide partial public financing for the bene-
fit of all recipient candidates who have qualified as candidates for
election to trial judge.
Section 5. This act shall take effect January 1, 1987.
